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Evolutionary game theory is an abstract and simple, but very powerful way to model evolutionary
dynamics. Even complex biological phenomena can sometimes be abstracted to simple two-player games.
But often, the interaction between several parties determines evolutionary success. Rather than pair-wise
interactions, in this case we must take into account the interactions between many players, which are
inherently more complicated than the usual two-player games, but can still yield simple results. In this
manuscript we derive the composition of a many-player multiple strategy system in the mutation-selection
equilibrium. This results in a simple expression which can be obtained by recursions using coalescence
theory. This approach can be modified to suit a variety of contexts, e.g. to find the equilibrium frequencies
of a finite number of alleles in a polymorphism or that of of different strategies in a social dilemma in a
cultural context.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Game theory was originally developed in the field of eco-
nomics to study strategic interactions amongst humans
[9, 54]. The “agents” who play against each other have
a set of “strategies” to choose from. The payoff which an
agent gets depends on its own strategy and the strategy of
the opponent. A player can decide which strategy to play
against an opponent of a given strategy.
In evolutionary game theory players are born with fixed
strategies instead, [28] which are considered to be inherited
traits. As usual, we assume a population game in which
every player effectively plays against the average opponent.
The success of a strategy depends on the number of players
of that strategy and also the number of players with other
strategies. A classical example is the Lotka-Volterra equa-
tion [19, 27, 53]. If the number of wolves increases then the
number of hares will decrease in turn leading to a decrease in
the number of wolves. Evolutionary game dynamics studies
the change in the frequencies of the strategies [31], which
depends on mutation, selection and drift.
A recurrent and obvious question asked in the study of
games is which is the best strategy? Assuming an infinitely
large population we can approach this question by the tradi-
tional replicator dynamics [19]. The frequency of a strategy
will increase if its average payoff is greater than the average
payoff of the whole population. That is, if the individuals of
a particular strategy are doing better on average than the
individuals of other strategies then that strategy spreads.
The average payoff of a strategy is also dependent on the
frequency of the strategy. For finite populations one must
resort to stochastic descriptions [8, 32, 41]. One important
quantity is the fixation probability. Consider two strategies
A and B in a population of size N . Let the population be
almost homogenous for B with only a single A. If there is
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no fitness difference amongst the strategies, i.e. selection
is neutral, then the probability that the A individual will
take over the entire population is 1/N . If this probability
is greater than 1/N we say that strategy A is favoured by
selection. When there are multiple strategies in the pop-
ulation, then a pair-wise comparison between the fixation
probabilities of all the strategies will reveal which is the
most abundant strategy [11, 15, 16, 43, 51]. This analysis
requires the assumption of low mutation rates.
When mutations become more frequent then the concept
of fixation itself is problematic and hence also that of fix-
ation probability. In such a case we resort to the average
frequency of a strategy which is maintained at the mutation-
selection balance. This has been termed as the abundance
of a strategy [3].
Consider n strategies which are effectively neutral against
each other. In such a case the abundance of all the strate-
gies in the stationary state will be just 1/n. Usually there
are fitness differences between the strategies. If the abun-
dance of a strategy is greater than that of all the other
strategies then we can say it is favoured under the effects
of mutation, selection and drift. Hence for n strategies, the
kth strategy will be favoured if the abundance of k is greater
than 1/n. Calculating the abundance of a strategy is a non-
trivial exercise even when assuming weak selection. [3] have
developed such an approach based on coalescence theory for
the case of two-player games and n strategies. Under cer-
tain conditions and weak selection, one can calculate the
most abundant strategy for arbitrary mutation rates even in
structured populations [2, 47, 48] and bimatrix games [35].
Usually two-player interactions are studied in evolution-
ary game theory. The analysis of Antal et al. is also for
two-player games. The interactions which we usually use as
examples in evolutionary game theory are in general multi-
player interactions making the systems nonlinear [33]. A
classical example where a certain minimum number of in-
dividuals are required to complete a task is group hunting.
[45] studied cooperative hunting in lions. A typical hunting
strategy is to approach the prey from at least three sides
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2to cutoff possible escape paths. This hunting approach is
impossible with only two hunters, i.e. a two-player game the-
oretic approach would be insufficient to capture the dynam-
ics. Although evolutionary dynamics of multi-player games
has received growing interest in the recent years, the main
focus has been the Public Goods Game and its variants
[4, 13, 15, 29, 36, 37, 40, 44, 52]. Only few authors consider
general evolutionary many person games [12, 14, 25]. We
extend the approach developed by [3] for two-player games
and multiple strategies to multi-player games. We show
that in the limit of weak selection it is possible to calculate
analytical results for n strategies and d players for arbitrary
mutation rates. For a three-player game the mathematical
analysis is described in detail. It is followed by an example
with simulations supporting the analytical result. Lastly we
discuss how the methodology can be extended for d-player
games and argue that a general approach is possible, but
tedious.
II. ABUNDANCES IN THE STATIONARY STATE FOR
THREE-PLAYER GAMES
[3] have developed an approach to find the abundances
of n strategies in a two-player game (d = 2). For a two-
player game even with n strategies, the payoff values can
be represented in the usual payoff matrix form. They can
be represented as quantities with two indices, ak,h. We
increase the complexity first by adding one more player (d =
3). This adds another index for the third player’s strategy
set, ak,h,i. To calculate the average change in the frequency
of a strategy we thus need to take into account this payoff
‘tensor’.
We calculate the abundance of a strategy at the
mutation-selection equilibrium. We begin by checking if
there is a change in the frequency of a strategy, say k on
average, due to selection. The average change under weak
selection is given by
〈∆xselk 〉δ =
δ
N
∑
h,i
ak,h,i〈xkxhxi〉 −
∑
h,i,j
ah,i,j〈xkxhxixj〉
 ,
(1)
where the angular brackets denote the average in the neutral
stationary state. The δ (selection intensity) as a lower index
on the left hand side, however, denotes that the average is
obtained under (weak) selection. If we pick three individuals
in the neutral stationary state, then the probability of the
first one to have strategy k, the next one h and the last i,
is given by the angular brackets in the first sum, 〈xkxhxi〉.
Furthermore, ak,h,i denotes the payoff values obtained by
a strategy k player when pitted against two other players
of strategy h and i. For n strategies the sums run from 1
to n. This equation is the special case of a d = 3 player
game. The derivation for arbitrary d is given in A. The
above equation is similar to the replicator equation, which
is also based on the difference between the average payoff
of a strategy and the average payoff of the population, but
as we will see below, here the averages on the right hand
side also include mutations.
To incorporate mutations in the process, we write the
total expected change due to mutation and selection as
∆xtotk = ∆x
sel
k (1− u) +
u
N
(
1
n
− xk
)
. (2)
The first term is the change in the frequency in the absence
of mutation. In presence of mutations, the second term
shows that the frequency can increase by 1/(nN) by ran-
dom mutation and decrease by xk/N due to random death.
A mutation means that with a certain probability u, the
strategy k can mutate to any of the n strategies.
We are interested in the abundance of a strategy in the
stationary state. In the stationary state, the average change
in frequency is zero, 〈∆xtotk 〉δ = 0, as the mutations are
balanced by selection. Averaging Eq. 2 under weak selection
thus gives us
〈xk〉δ = 1
n
+N
1− u
u
〈∆xselk 〉δ. (3)
This is our quantity of interest, the abundance of a strategy
when the system has reached the stationary state. For d = 2
player games, this quantity is given by [3]. For the abun-
dance of a strategy to be greater than neutral, 〈xk〉δ > 1n ,
the change in frequency in the stationary state due to se-
lection must be greater than zero, 〈∆xselk 〉δ > 0.
Thus, we need to resolve the right hand side of Equation
1. Consider the first term in the brackets. In the neutral
stationary state the number of combinations in the sums
reduces due to symmetry, e.g. 〈xixjxj〉 = 〈xjxixj〉 =
〈xjxjxi〉. Hence, we need to calculate only three different
terms, 〈x1x1x1〉, 〈x1x2x2〉 and 〈x1x2x3〉. Also for d player
games, the terms in the sums are reduced. For the sec-
ond term in the brackets we need to calculate five different
types of averages, 〈x1x1x1x1〉, 〈x1x2x2x2〉, 〈x1x1x2x2〉,
〈x1x1x2x3〉 and 〈x1x2x3x4〉. These averages are derived
in the B. Using an approach from coalescence theory, we
derive si, the probability that i individuals chosen from the
stationary state all have the same strategy. Hence s4 is
the probability that four individuals chosen in the station-
ary state all have the same strategy. If there are in all n
strategies, then the probability that all have exactly strat-
egy 1 is s4/n. Hence, 〈x1x1x1x1〉 = 〈x2x2x2x2〉 = . . . =
〈xnxnxnxn〉 = s4/n. Conversely, s¯i is the probability that
if we choose i individuals in the stationary state, each has
a unique strategy. Knowing these averages helps us resolve
Eq. (1),
〈∆xselk 〉δ =
δµ(Lk +Mkµ+Hkµ
2)
Nn(1 + µ)(2 + µ)(3 + µ)
(4)
where µ = Nu and Lk, Mk and Hk are functions consisting
only of the number of strategies n and the payoff values
ak,h,i (see B). Using this and evaluating Eq. (3) gives us
the abundance of the kth strategy.
〈xk〉δ = 1
n
[
1 +
δ(N − µ)(Lk +Mkµ+Hkµ2)
(1 + µ)(2 + µ)(3 + µ)
]
. (5)
3This expression is valid for large population sizes, Nδ  1
and any µ = Nu. Since we have 0 ≤ u ≤ 1, µ is bounded
by 0 ≤ µ ≤ N .
We arrive at the result with an implicit assumption that
there are at least four strategies. For n ≤ d, each player
cannot have a unique strategy and hence we need to set the
corresponding terms to zero (see B). If there are less than
n = 4 strategies then s¯4 vanishes. This does not affect
our general result as the affected terms in Lk, Mk and Hk
simply vanish.
III. AN EXAMPLE FOR THREE-PLAYER GAMES WITH
THREE STRATEGIES
To illustrate the analytical approach we explore an evo-
lutionary three-player game with three strategies A, B and
C. Let our focal individual play strategy A. The other two
players can play any of the three strategies. This can lead to
a potential complication. Consider the combinations AAB
or ABA. If the order of players does not matter, then both
these configurations give the same payoffs but if they do
matter then we need to consider them separately. Here we
assume random matching, and hence the order drops out
(e.g. AAB and ABA are equally likely). We consider an
arbitrary game as denoted in Table I.
We need to calculate the average change in the frequency
of strategy A due to selection, i.e. Eq. (1). We denote
the co-efficients of the averages in the first sum by α1,
α2 and α3. Hence for example, α3 = aA,B,C + aA,C,B .
Similarly for the second sum we have β1 to β4 (Note that
β1 = α1 = aA,A,A). Thus we have,∑
h,i
aA,h,i〈xAxhxi〉 = α1〈xAxAxA〉+ α2〈xAxBxB〉
+α3〈xAxBxC〉 (6)
and∑
h,i,j
ah,i,j〈xAxhxixj〉 = β1〈xAxAxAxA〉+ β2〈xAxBxBxB〉
+β3〈xAxAxBxB〉+ β4〈xAxAxBxC〉.
(7)
Note that the term 〈xAxBxCxD〉 which would appear with
a factor β5, does not appear, as we have only three strate-
gies and thus s¯4 = 0. This also alters the definition of
〈xAxAxBxC〉 and 〈xAxAxBxB〉 (see Figure 1, all terms
dependent on s¯4 are affected).
We know the form of Lk, Mk and Hk from B as,
Lk =
1
n [2α1(n− 1) + 3α2 − 2β2 − β3] (8)
Mk =
1
n2 [(3n− 3)α1 + (n+ 3)α2 + 3α3 − 3β2 − 2β3 − β4]
(9)
Hk =
1
n3 [n(α1 + α2 + α3)− (β1 + β2 + β3 + β4 + β5)] (10)
With Lk, Mk and Hk as above, Eq. (5) for n = 3 reduces
to,
〈xA〉δ = 1
3
[
1 +
δ(N − µ)(Lk +Mkµ+Hkµ2)
(1 + µ)(2 + µ)(3 + µ)
]
.(11)
〈∆xselk 〉δ =
δ
N
∑
h,i
ak,h,i〈xkxhxi〉 −
∑
h,i,j
ah,i,j〈xkxhxixj〉

〈x1x1x1〉 = s3
n
〈x1x2x2〉 = s2 − s3
n(n− 1)
〈x1x2x3〉 = 1− 3s2 + 2s3
n(n− 1)(n− 2)
〈x1x1x1x1〉 = s4
n
〈x1x2x2x2〉 = s3 − s4
n(n− 1)
〈x1x1x2x2〉 = s¯4 + 3s4 − 8s3 + 6s2 − 1
3n(n− 1)
〈x1x1x2x3〉 = 1− 3s2 + 2s3 − s¯4
3n(n− 1)(n− 2)
〈x1x2x3x4〉 = s¯4
n(n− 1)(n− 2)(n− 3)
Antal T, et al. J Theor Biol. 2009, 259 Supplementary Material
Three-player game
FIG. 1. The average change in the frequency of strategy k
due to selection, 〈∆xselk 〉δ for a three-player game. Notice first
the similarity to the replicator equation where also we look
at how a strategy is faring compared to the population. The
first term in the bracket is analogous to the average fitness of
strategy k. If we pick three individuals in the stationary state,
then the probability that the first one has strategy k, second
h and the third i is given by 〈xkxhxi〉 (dashed box). Even for
n strategies there are only three possible combinations, either
all can have the same strategy, a pair has the same strategy
or all three have different strategies. These probabilities were
calculated by [3]. The si’s appearing in the averages are the
probabilities that if we choose i individuals from the station-
ary distribution then they all have the same strategy. The
second term in the bracket is analogous to the average fitness
of the population in the stationary state. For this we need
to pick four individuals and look for all the different combi-
nations (solid box). For n strategies, five combinations can
explain all the different configurations. These range from all
the individuals having the same strategy 〈x1x1x1x1〉 to all
having a different strategy 〈x1x2x3x4〉 (B). For the latter, we
calculate s¯i, the probability that we choose i individuals from
the stationary distribution and each of them has a unique
strategy. For a general d-player game we need to pick d indi-
viduals for the first term and d+ 1 for the second.
This gives us the abundance of strategy A at the muta-
tion selection equilibrium. Repeating the same procedure
for strategies B and C gives the analytical lines in Figure 2.
Although the analytical solutions are valid for large popula-
tion sizes only, we still see a good agreement between the
simulation and theory results, even for a population size as
small as 30.
IV. ABUNDANCES IN d > 3 PLAYER GAMES.
We can repeat the whole procedure for d = 4 player
games with n strategies. The formula for the abundance
remains the same, Eq. (3), but the average change due to
selection, Eq. (1), becomes more complicated. We need to
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FIG. 2. For a three-player game with three strategies
(d = 3;n = 3) we plot the average abundances of the three
strategies as a function of the mutation probability u. The
payoff table from Table I is used. The lines are the solu-
tions of Eq. (3) and the symbols are the simulation results for
the three strategies. Although the calculations are valid for
large populations we see a good agreement even for a popula-
tion size of N = 30 (selection intensity δ = 0.003, simulation
points are obtained averaging over 20000 independent runs,
each over 2×106 time steps after a transient phase of N time
steps).
Weights
( Total 9 ) 1 2 2 1 2 1
AA AB AC BB BC CC
A 2 2 3 1 3 4
B 2 1 2 3 0 2
C 2 12 2 0 1 3
TABLE I. An example payoff table for d = 3 and n = 3.
Consider a three-player game with three strategies A, B and
C. The strategy of the focal individual is in the column on
the left. For example the payoff received by a C individual
when playing in a configuration of CAB is 12. From the focal
individual’s point of view there are two ways of this config-
uration CAB and CBA as it is twice as likely as compared
to e.g. CAA. Hence we weight that payoff value by 2 when
calculating the average payoff of strategy C.
add an index in the sums,
〈∆xselk 〉δ =
δ
N
( ∑
l,m,n
ak,l,m,n〈xkxlxmxn〉
−
∑
l,m,n,o
al,m,n,o〈xkxlxmxnxo〉
)
(12)
The first term is comparatively simple as we already know all
the different ways of picking four individuals. For the second
term we need to know the different possible combinations
of strategies when picking five individuals from the neutral
stationary state.
For d players and n strategies we can construct an expres-
sion analogous to Eq. 1. Consider for example the strategies
played by d individuals denoted by, r1, r2, r3 . . . rd. Note
that each of these can be a strategy from the strategy set
1, 2, 3 . . . n. Let k be our strategy of interest. Then the
expression for the change of strategy k due to selection is
given by,
〈∆xselk 〉δ =
δ
N
( ∑
r2,...rd
ak,r2,...rd〈xkxr2xr3 . . . xrd〉
−
∑
r2,...rd+1
ar2,...rd+1〈xkxr2xr3 . . . xrd+1〉
)
(13)
where the sums range as usual from 1 to n (A). Solving this
and plugging it in Eq. (3) gives the generalized expression
for the abundance of strategy k for an n strategy, d-player
game. We see that in the first sum the averages are for
choosing d players but for the second it is d + 1. Hence
we need to calculate the probabilities of the form sd+1, but
sd+1 depends on sd. Thus we have to solve the expression
recursively e.g. for d = 6, we will need to pick 7 players at
most and we must solve the expression for d = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
before (d = 2 has been solved by [3] and d = 3 in this
paper). As d increases calculating sd+1 is not enough and
we will also need to calculate terms such as s¯d+1 which is
already the case for d = 3.
V. SPECIAL CASE: TWO STRATEGIES, n = 2
Games with two strategies have been very well studied.
In two-player games with two strategies, one strategy can
replace another with a higher probability if the sum of its
payoff values is greater than the sum of the payoff values of
the other strategy. This is valid under small mutation rates
for deterministic evolutionary dynamics [20]. The result also
holds for for different dynamical regimes under specific lim-
its of selection intensity and mutation rates [1, 10, 32]. Re-
cently it has been shown that this result can be generalized
for d-player games with two strategies [12, 25].
Hence the condition which we find for d-player games
should be identical to Lk > 0 derived in this paper for d
players. We check this for d = 3,
Lk =
1
2 [2α1(2− 1) + 3α2 − 2β2 − β3] (14)
= 12 [2a1,1,1 + 3(a1,1,2 + a1,2,1 + a1,2,2)
−2(a1,1,2 + a1,2,1 + a2,1,1 + a2,2,2)− a1,2,2 − a2,1,2 − a2,2,1]
(15)
Thus Lk > 0 is equivalent to,
2a1,1,1+a1,1,2 + a1,2,1 + 2a1,2,2
> 2a2,1,1 + a2,1,2 + a2,2,1 + 2a2,2,2
(16)
If we assume that the order of players does not matter then
we have a1,1,2 = a1,2,1 and a2,1,2 = a2,2,1. This yields
a1,1,1 + a1,1,2 + a1,2,2 > a2,1,1 + a2,1,2 + a2,2,2, (17)
5T1 T2 F
T1
−c1
2
b− c1 −c1
T2 b− c2 −c22 −c2
F 0 0 0
TABLE II. Payoff table for a two-player game with three
strategies, T1 i.e. specialising in task 1 or T2 i.e. specialising
in task 2. T1 produces enzyme 1 and T2 produces enzyme
2. When both the enzymes are present then a benefit b is
obtained. The cost of producing enzyme 1 is c1 and the cost
to produce enzyme 2 is c2. If the partner in the game is of
the same strategy then the cost is shared. The freeloading
strategy F does not pay any cost and so the benefits of the
resource are unavailable to it.
which is exactly the condition that has been obtained previ-
ously using different methods and different notation by [25]
and [12].
VI. APPLICATION TO A TASK ALLOCATION
PROBLEM
To demonstrate the power of the approach we are mo-
tivated by [55] who studies the problem of task allocation
and of the evolution of division of labour. [55] studied a
two-player game between task 1 specialists (T1), task 2
specialists (T2) and generalists. Instead, we have T1, T2
and freeloaders F . We can think of this problem in con-
text of bacteria that need two types of enzymes to obtain
resources from the environment. One strain produces one
type of enzyme at a cost c1 and another strain produces the
second type of enzyme at a cost of c2. We also have the
freeloading strain which does not produce any enzyme but
can get resources by the help of the other two strains. The
benefit of getting the resources is given by b. We have the
condition that the total cost is less than the benefit accrued
i.e. b > c1 + c2. Further assume that our contenders are
conservative in the enzyme production. Sensing who they
are pitted against, the strains share the costs of producing
the enzyme. Thus a two-player payoff matrix for such a set-
ting can be written down as in Table II. It is hard to imagine
though that the bacteria interact only in a pair-wise fashion.
Although it is hard to judge how many players are interact-
ing, we can at least increase the complexity by one more
player and study what effect this has on the abundances of
the strains. Therefore, we study the system in a three-player
setting. In this case the payoff table will look like III.
We calculate the abundances of the strains in these dif-
ferent settings, cf. Figure 3. Even when there are almost no
mutations there is a quantitative difference between the av-
erage frequencies of the strains. For a higher mutation prob-
ability the difference is also qualitative. While the freeload-
ers never pay a cost they have the highest abundance in
the two-player setting for any mutation probability. For the
same reasoning but in three-player games we see that the
abundance of the freeloaders falls below that of T2 for a
Weights
( Total 9 ) 1 2 2 1 2 1
T1T1 T1T2 T1F T2T2 T2F FF
T1
−c1
3
b− c1
2
−c1
2
b− c1 b− c1 −c1
T2 b− c2 b− c22 b− c2 −c23 −c22 −c2
F 0 b 0 0 0 0
TABLE III. Payoff table for the same game as discussed in
Table II. T1 and T2 refer to specialising in task 1 and 2 namely
producing enzyme 1 and 2. Note the costs can also be shared
if at least one of the game partners is of the same strategy.
In this case the freeloaders can get the benefit when the other
two players produce both enzymes.
certain range of mutation probability.
VII. DISCUSSION
Public goods games are often used as examples of multi-
player games. In the beginning there were the cooperators
and defectors. Then came the punishers and then the loners
[13, 46]. Now we talk about second order punishers, pool
and peer punishers [43] and more. Studying these systems
for small mutation rates and arbitrary selection intensity
is almost becoming standard [11, 15, 16, 43, 51]. In the
limit of weak selection our method allows to find out which
strategy is most abundant for arbitrary mutation rates.
Yet, another important aspect of most social dilemmas
and many other biological examples is that they involve
multiple players [5, 26, 30, 45]. [2, 3] have made use of
the coalescence approach to characterize the mutation pro-
cess under neutrality and then apply it under weak selection
to two-player games with n strategies (n × n). Here we
extend the approach to d-player games with n strategies.
We give an example for an n × n × n game and derive
the analogous expressions for abundances of the strategies
for arbitrary mutation rates. When we increase the number
of players to d, the payoff matrix becomes a d dimensional
object. We run into the problem of whether the order of
players matters or not. Either way this does not influence
our results but notation-wise it is easier if the order of play-
ers does not matter. Adding a new player adds a new index
to the payoff values. For calculating the abundance we need
to assess Eq. (13). For solving the two sums in Eq. (13) we
need to know the different combinations of choosing d play-
ers and d+ 1 players from the neutral coalescent stationary
state.
To illustrate the complexity of the situation take for ex-
ample s4. This is the probability that four chosen individuals
have the same strategy. In C we have shown that deriving s4
depends on s3 which depends on s2 in turn. Hence in gen-
eral to derive sd+1, we need to know sd, sd−1, sd−2 . . . , s2.
In addition, for general d-player games we need quantities
such as s¯d+1, probability that d+1 individuals chosen in the
stationary state all have different strategies. In the absence
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FIG. 3. The strains of a bacteria T1 and T2 produce the enzymes 1 and 2 which when present together provide a benefit b.
When more than one individual of the same strain is present then the production costs for the enzymes, c1 and c2 are shared.
A third strain F does not produce any enzyme and thus avoids the costs and cannot obtain the benefit on its own. We can
analyse the interactions by assuming them to be pair-wise (two-player game, Table II) or in triplets (three-player game, III).
We notice that the abundances of the three strains are qualitatively and quantitatively different in the two settings even though
the underlying rules defining the interactions are the same. Under neutrality the abundance of all the strains would be given
by the dashed line. The full lines are the analytical results obtained by solving Eq. (3), assuming b = 1.0, c1 = 0.6, c2 = 0.2
and a population size of N = 30 with selection intensity δ = 0.003.
of mutations such probabilities as s¯d+1 vanish and we are
left with only sd+1, as mentioned in [34]. If n < d then
s¯d+1 is zero and hence the terms dependent on it need to
be recalculated. After recalculation the terms which are af-
fected either vanish or are automatically adjusted such that
the result can be written again in the form for Lk’s, Mk’s
and Hk’s. However, for a d player game, d−2 intermediate
terms such as Mk appear.
For two strategies, Lk reduces to the general con-
dition derived in [12, 25] and again holds for ar-
bitrary d. For Hk for any number of strategies
we conjecture that it will always be of the form
1
nd
[
n
(∑
r2,...rd
ak,r2,...rd
)
−
(∑
r2,...rd+1
ar2,...rd+1
)]
from Eq. (13). Addressing a generalization for d-player
games is not a fundamental problem of the approach but
requires a tedious recursive effort and poses a notational
challenge. At the coalescence level the problem rests on
permutations and combinations.
Arbitrary mutation rates can be interpreted in different
ways. In the social learning context [49] it can be thought
of as the exploration rate where the players experiment
with different strategies. A recent behavioral experiment
suggests that humans change their strategies with a prob-
ability much higher than usually considered in theoretical
models [50]. Analytical results for such high mutation rates
can now be provided utilising the approach outlined herein.
Small mutation rates are most relevant in population genetic
contexts where the strategies can be thought of as alleles.
While most people think of evolutionary game theory as a
phenotypic approach, one can as well consider evolution-
ary games on the level of genes [6, 17–19, 38, 39, 42]. A
long standing problem in theoretical biology is to explain
the maintenance of polymorphisms. So far, the correspond-
ing models typically assumed small mutation rates, but our
approach provides a way to calculate the abundances for
arbitrary mutation rates. However, our aim is not to cal-
culate abundances, but to depict a way to derive them. A
two-player interaction can capture the effect of one allele
on another, but the epistatic interaction of many loci calls
for a theory of many-player interactions.
Making use of our approach we can precisely determine
the composition of a population with any finite number of
different types under weak selection for arbitrary mutation
rates. Another convenient way of finding the strategy which
performs the best is the limit of small mutation rates. For
small mutation rates, the system spends most of its time in
a monomorphic state. We can approximate the system by
just looking at fixation probabilities of the different types.
Our approach illustrates that the interaction of d players
is significantly more complex than the usual two-player
games. General multi-player games pose exciting challenges
way beyond the usual intricacies of public goods games.
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Appendix A: Deriving the average change due to selection
We begin the Appendix by first deriving the average
change in the frequency of a strategy under selection for
an arbitrary number of players (d) and strategies (n). In
7B, we consider the special case d = 3. The more technical
calculations based on coalescence theory can be found in
Section C.
Let us begin with the simple case of a two-player game.
The payoff matrix for a two-player game, A with n strate-
gies is an n× n matrix,
A =

1 2 . . . n
1 a1,1 a1,2 . . . a1,n
2 a2,1 a2,2 . . . a2,n
...
...
...
. . .
...
n an,1 an,2 . . . an,n
 (A1)
The average fitness of strategy 1 can be written down as,
f1 = 1 + δ
(
n∑
h=1
a1,hxh
)
(A2)
where the leading 1 is the baseline fitness and δ > 0 is the
intensity of selection. The variable xh is the frequency of
players with strategy h,
∑n
h=1 xh = 1. We assume that the
δ is so small that the fitness is always positive. Similarly,
for a three-player game the payoffs have an additional index.
Thus we can write the average fitness of strategy 1 as,
f1 = 1 + δ
∑
h,i
a1,h,i (xhxi)
 (A3)
As usual, the sums run from 1 to n, the number of strate-
gies. Continuing up to d players we now consider r2 . . . rd
the strategies of players 2 . . . d as the strategy of one of the
players is set to k, i.e. r1 = k. We see that the average
payoff of strategy k can be written as,
fk = 1 + δ
( ∑
r2,...,rd
ak,r2,...,rd (xr2xr3 · · ·xrd)
)
(A4)
The average payoff of the whole population is given by F
as,
F =
n∑
k=1
xkfk (A5)
Now we need to consider the dynamics of the process. The
Moran process is used, where in each time-step an individ-
ual is chosen proportional to its fitness to reproduce and a
randomly chosen individual dies. With probability 1−u the
individual chosen for reproduction produces an exact copy
as itself, but with probability u, a mutation occurs and the
offspring can be of any of the n strategies.
If the abundance of a strategy is greater than 1/n, then it
is favoured at the mutation-selection equilibrium. To calcu-
late the abundance of strategy k we begin with the average
number of offsprings of an individual of strategy k, which is
given by,
ωk = 1− 1
N
+
1
N
fk
F
. (A6)
The first term captures the survival of the parent. The
second and third terms refer to the random death and fitness
proportional reproduction. For δ  1, we have,
ωk ≈ 1 + δ
N
[( ∑
r2,...,rd
ak,r2,...,rd (xr2xr3 · · ·xrd)
)
−
∑
rd+1
xrd+1
∑
r2,...,rd
ar1,r2,...,rd (xr2xr3 · · ·xrd)
].
(A7)
The change in the frequency of strategy k, xk, due to se-
lection is given by,
∆xselk = xkωk − xk. (A8)
The vector x = (x1, . . . , xn) contains all possible frequency
compositions of the system. The system will be in state x
with probability Qδ(x). Hence by averaging ∆x
sel
k in the
leading order of δ we obtain,
〈∆xselk 〉 ≈
∑
x
∆xselk Qδ(x)
= δ
∑
x
(
1
N
xk
[( ∑
r2,...rd
ak,r2,...rd (xr2xr3 . . . xrd)
)
−
 ∑
r2,...rd+1
ar2,...rd+1
(
xr2xr3 . . . xrd+1
)])Qδ(x)
(A9)
Thus we reach the expression for the average change in the
frequency of strategy k due to selection in the stationary
state as,
〈∆xselk 〉δ=
δ
N
〈xk
[( ∑
r2,...rd
ak,r2,...rd (xr2xr3 . . . xrd)
)
−
 ∑
r2,...rd+1
ar2,...rd+1
(
xr2xr3 . . . xrd+1
)]〉
=
δ
N
( ∑
r2,...rd
ak,r2,...rd〈xkxr2xr3 . . . xrd〉
−
∑
r2,...rd+1
ar2,...rd+1〈xkxr2xr3 . . . xrd+1〉
)
(A10)
Notice the form of a replicator like equation in the above
terms. We look for the difference between the average pay-
off of a strategy and the average payoff of the population.
The first sum consists of a product of d frequencies while
the second sum requires a product of d+1. Particularly, we
consider the case d = 3. For strategy k the average change
due to selection is given by
〈∆xselk 〉δ =
δ
N
∑
h,i
ak,h,i〈xkxhxi〉 −
∑
h,i,j
ah,i,j〈xkxhxixj〉
 .
(A11)
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1. Choosing a set of players
To solve Eq. (A11) we need to solve the two sums on the
right hand side. The first sum can be solved using the tech-
nique derived by [3]. For the second sum we need to know
the different forms of the averages possible. Using symme-
try arguments such as 〈x1x2x2x3〉 = 〈x1x2x3x3〉 (this is
valid because we average under neutrality) only five differ-
ent kinds of averages are required, 〈x1x1x1x1〉, 〈x1x2x2x2〉,
〈x1x1x2x2〉, 〈x1x1x2x3〉 and 〈x1x2x3x4〉. The quantities
〈x1x1x1x1〉 and 〈x1x2x3x4〉 are derived in section C based
on coalescence theory. The rest of the averages can be
written down as,
(i) Three of a kind, 〈x1x2x2x2〉.
〈x1x2x2x2〉 =
〈(
1−
n∑
i=2
xi
)
x2x2x2
〉
= 〈x1x1x1〉 − 〈x1x1x1x1〉 − (n− 2)〈x1x2x2x2〉
=
〈x1x1x1〉 − 〈x1x1x1x1〉
n− 1 (B1)
(ii) Two pairs, 〈x1x1x2x2〉.
〈x1x1x2x2〉 =
〈
(1− x2 −
n∑
i=3
xi)x1x2x2
〉
= 〈x1x2x2〉 − 〈x1x2x2x2〉 − (n− 2)〈x1x1x2x3〉
(B2)
(iii) Single pair, 〈x1x1x2x3〉.
〈x1x1x2x3〉 =
〈(
1− x2 − x3 −
n∑
i=4
xi
)
x1x2x3
〉
= 〈x1x2x3〉 − 2〈x1x1x2x3〉 − (n− 3)〈x1x2x3x4〉
=
〈x1x2x3〉 − (n− 3)〈x1x2x3x4〉
3
. (B3)
Thus we can write all averages in terms of 〈x1x1x1x1〉,
〈x1x2x3x4〉 and the known quantities from [3],
〈x1x2x2x2〉 = 〈x1x1x1〉 − 〈x1x1x1x1〉
n− 1
〈x1x1x2x2〉 = 〈x1x2x2〉 − 〈x1x2x2x2〉 − (n− 2)〈x1x1x2x3〉
〈x1x1x2x3〉 = 〈x1x2x3〉 − (n− 3)〈x1x2x3x4〉
3
(B4)
From [3] we know the form of,
〈x1x1x1〉 = s3
n
〈x1x2x2〉 = s2 − s3
n(n− 1)
〈x1x2x3〉 = 1− 3s2 + 2s3
n(n− 1)(n− 2) , (B5)
where the probability that if we choose i individuals from
the stationary state of a neutral coalescent then all i have
the same strategy is si. The quantities s2 and s3 have
been previously derived in [3]. For completeness we repeat
the derivation in Section C. In Section C s4 is calculated,
which is the probability of choosing four individuals from the
neutral stationary state and all have the same strategy. If
there are n strategies then the probability that all four have
strategy 1 is s4/n. Thus 〈x1x1x1x1〉 = s4/n. Similarly, the
probability that all four have different strategies is s¯4. The
exact case when the first individual has strategy 1 , second
has 2 , third has 3 and the fourth has 4 is just 〈x1x2x3x4〉 =
s¯4/(n(n−1)(n−2)(n−3)). Using this information we can
get the expression for all the five averages as,
〈x1x1x1x1〉 = s4
n
〈x1x2x2x2〉 = s3 − s4
n(n− 1)
〈x1x1x2x2〉 = s¯4 + 3s4 − 8s3 + 6s2 − 1
3n(n− 1)
〈x1x1x2x3〉 = 1− 3s2 + 2s3 − s¯4
3n(n− 1)(n− 2)
〈x1x2x3x4〉 = s¯4
n(n− 1)(n− 2)(n− 3) . (B6)
The quantities s2, s3, s4 and s¯4 are derived in Section C.
Substituting these values above yields,
〈x1x1x1〉 = n(n+ µ)(2n+ µ)(3 + µ)C
〈x1x2x2〉 = nµ(n+ µ)(3 + µ)C
〈x1x2x3〉 = nµ2(3 + µ)C
〈x1x1x1x1〉 = (n+ µ)(2n+ µ)(3n+ µ)C
〈x1x2x2x2〉 = µ(n+ µ)(2n+ µ)C
〈x1x1x2x2〉 = µ(n+ µ)2C
〈x1x1x2x3〉 = µ2(n+ µ)C
〈x1x2x3x4〉 = µ3C. (B7)
where C =
[
n4(1 + µ)(2 + µ)(3 + µ)
]−1
.
2. Number of strategies with respect to the number of
players
Now that we know the form of the averages, we can begin
expanding the sums from Eq. (A11), first for d = 3 and for
n > 3. Consider the first sum,∑
h,i
ak,h,i〈xkxhxi〉 = 〈x1x1x1〉ak,k,k
+〈x1x2x2〉
∑
h,i
k 6=h=i 6=k
h=k,i 6=k
i=k,h 6=k
ak,h,i
+〈x1x2x3〉
∑
h,i
k 6=h6=i 6=k
ak,h,i. (B8)
9For the ease of notation we denote the co-efficients on the
right hand side by α1 = ak,k,k, α2 =
∑
h,i
k 6=h=i 6=k
h=k,i 6=k
i=k,h 6=k
ak,h,i,
α3 =
∑
h,i
k 6=h6=i 6=k
ak,h,i. Hence, we have,∑
h,i
ak,h,i〈xkxhxi〉 = 〈x1x1x1〉α1 + 〈x1x2x2〉α2 + 〈x1x2x3〉α3.
(B9)
Similarly, the second sum in Eq. (A11) becomes,∑
h,i,j
ah,i,j〈xkxhxixj〉 = 〈x1x1x1x1〉β1 + 〈x1x2x2x2〉β2
+〈x1x1x2x2〉β3 + 〈x1x1x2x3〉β4
+〈x1x2x3x4〉β5 (B10)
Note that β1 = α1. Substituting the expressions for the
averages from Eqs. (B7),∑
h,i ak,h,i〈xkxhxi〉
C
= n(n+ µ)(2n+ µ)(3 + µ)α1 + nµ(n+ µ)(3 + µ)α2
+nµ2(3 + µ)α3
= 6n3α1 + n
[
2n2α1 + 3n(3α1 + α2)
]
µ
+n [n(3α1 + α2) + 3(α1 + α2 + α3)]µ
2
+n(α1 + α2 + α3)µ
3 (B11)
for the first sum. For the second sum,∑
h,i,j ah,i,j〈xkxhxixj〉
C
= (n+ µ)(2n+ µ)(3n+ µ)α1 + µ(n+ µ)(2n+ µ)β2
+µ(n+ µ)2β3 + µ
2(n+ µ)β4 + µ
3β5
= 6n3α1 + n
2(11α1 + 2β2 + β3)µ
+n(6α1 + 3β2 + 2β3 + β4)µ
2
+(α1 + β2 + β3 + β4 + β5)µ
3. (B12)
Going back to our original Equation (A11) and organising
it in powers of µ, we obtain,
N〈∆xselk 〉δ
δC
=
∑
h,i
ak,h,i〈xkxhxi〉 −
∑
h,i,j
ah,i,j〈xkxhxixj〉

=
1
n3
[n2(2α1(n− 1) + 3α2 − 2β2 − β3)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Lk
µn3 +
1
n3
[n ((3n− 3)α1 + (n+ 3)α2 + 3α3 − 3β2 − 2β3 − β4)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mk
µ2n3
+
1
n3
[n (α1 + α2 + α3)− (β1 + β2 + β3 + β4 + β5)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Hk
µ3n3
(B13)
Notice that the coefficients of the different orders of µ con-
sist only of the number of strategies and the payoff values.
Denoting the coefficients of µn3, µ2n3 and µ3n3 as Lk, Mk
and Hk respectively, we get the following result
〈∆xselk 〉δ =
δµ(Lk +Mkµ+Hkµ
2)
Nn(1 + µ)(2 + µ)(3 + µ)
(B14)
Next we consider d = 3 and n = 3. In this case the sums
in Eq. (A11) are,∑
h,i
ak,h,i〈xkxhxi〉 = 〈x1x1x1〉α1 + 〈x1x2x2〉α2 + 〈x1x2x3〉α3
(B15)
and∑
h,i,j
ah,i,j〈xkxhxixj〉 = 〈x1x1x1x1〉α1 + 〈x1x2x2x2〉β2
+〈x1x1x2x2〉β3 + 〈x1x1x2x3〉β4.
(B16)
Thus s¯4 = 0 and we do not have the term 〈x1x2x3x4〉. This
changes the averages, 〈x1x1x2x2〉 and 〈x1x1x2x3〉 as they
were dependent on 〈x1x2x3x4〉 (see Eqs. (B6)). Eqs. (B7)
do not change, but β5 = 0. Solving the two sums using
these expressions and evaluating Eq. (A11), specifically for
n = 3,
N〈∆xselk 〉δ
δC
=
 3∑
h,i
ak,h,i〈xkxhxi〉 −
3∑
h,i,j
ah,i,j〈xkxhxixj〉

= 9 [4α1 + 3α2 − 2β2 − β3]µ
+3 [6α1 + 6α2 + 3α3 − 3β2 − 2β3 − β4]µ2
+ [3 (α1 + α2 + α3)− (β1 + β2 + β3 + β4)]µ3
(B17)
which can be written in the form of Eq. (B14).
Finally for d = 3 and n = 2 the sums in Eq. (A11)
consist only of the following terms,
2∑
h,i
ak,h,i〈xkxhxi〉 = 〈x1x1x1〉α1 + 〈x1x2x2〉α2.
(B18)
and
2∑
h,i,j
ah,i,j〈xkxhxixj〉 = 〈x1x1x1x1〉α1 + 〈x1x2x2x2〉β2
+〈x1x1x2x2〉β3. (B19)
The form of the averages does not change from the general
form given in Eqs. (B6) except for 〈x1x1x2x2〉 which de-
pends on s¯4. Due to n = 2, s¯4 = 0 and also α3 = β5 =
β4 = 0. For this special case thus, we have
N〈∆xselk 〉δ
δC
=
 2∑
h,i
ak,h,i〈xkxhxi〉 −
2∑
h,i,j
ah,i,j〈xkxhxixj〉

= 4 [2α1 + 3α2 − 2β2 − β3]µ
+2 [(3α1 + 5α2 − 3β2 − 2β3)]µ2
+ [2 (α1 + α2)− (β1 + β2 + β3)]µ3 (B20)
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which can be cast in the form of Eq. (B14).
This case is actually very well studied. For multiple play-
ers and two strategies it has been recently shown that the
condition for strategy A replacing strategy B with a higher
probability simply depends on the sums of the payoff values
of the two strategies [12, 25]. This result is valid for ran-
dom matching of players and small mutation rates. In our
case, the condition for small mutation rates is obtained by
checking the condition Lk > 0, i.e.,
2α1 + 3α2 − 2β2 − β3 > 0. (B21)
Inserting the definitions of α1, α2, β1 and β2 and rearrang-
ing leads to
2a1,1,1+a1,1,2 + a1,2,1 + 2a1,2,2
> 2a2,1,1 + a2,1,2 + a2,2,1 + 2a2,2,2 (B22)
Under random matching we have a1,1,2 = a1,2,1 and
a2,1,2 = a2,2,1. Thus, this is equivalent to
a1,1,1 + a1,1,2 + a1,2,2 > a2,1,1 + a2,1,2 + a2,2,2(B23)
which is the condition derived in [12, 25]. When we do the
same analysis for n = 2 and increasing d, and compare the
Lk for each d, we will find a general form of the condition
already given in [12, 25] for small mutation rates.
Appendix C: Calculating probabilities based on Coalescence
Theory
In the coalescence approach, we take a sample from the
present generation and look back in time with respect to the
sample. Consider two copies of a gene. Sometime back in
the past they come together to a common ancestor. This
means the lineages of the two copies “coalesce” back in
time. In general if we have a sample of d individuals from
the present then sometime back the lineages of two of the
individuals will coalesce and there will be d− 1 individuals.
In all thus there will be d − 1 coalescence events until we
arrive at the most recent common ancestor, the root of the
coalescent. [21–24] showed that the mathematical process
of joining lineages leading up to the common ancestor can
be analytically understood. He also showed that the coa-
lescent encompassess a broad class of population dynamics
models including Wright-Fisher and Moran processes.
There are three assumptions of the most basic coalescent
theory [56],
• The population is not subdivided or structured.
• The population size remains constant over time.
• Genetic differences have no effect on the fitness of
an individual. In our case this means that different
strategies have the same fitness, the neutral case.
We follow the approach developed in [2, 3]. In a neutral
Moran process two individuals will have the same ancestor in
one update step with probability 2/N2. We use a continu-
ous time limit by rescaling the time such that τ = t(2/N2).
We determine the results for a large, but finite population
size N .
The beauty of the coalescence process lies in the separa-
tion of the genealogical part and the mutation process. This
is due to the assumption of neutrality. Mutations occur at
the rate of µ/2 where µ = Nu and u is the probability with
which the offspring obtains any one of the n strategies at
random. The mutation probability u can range from 0 to 1,
but when the mutation probability is 1 then the strategies
would oscillate. Hence we rescale the mutation rate by 1/2.
It has been shown by [22, 23] that when N is large, the
coalescent time is exponentially distributed as,
fi(τ) =
(
i
2
)
e−(
i
2)τ . (C1)
On each trajectory no mutation occurs in time τ with prob-
ability
γ = e−
µ
2 τ . (C2)
1. Calculation of s2
First we repeat the derivations of [3] for completeness
of the process. Also this will help simplify the terminolo-
gies used in the next subsection. The quantity s2 is the
probability that two individuals chosen randomly in a neu-
tral coalescent process have the same strategy. According
to the coalescent back in time there was a single common
ancestor of the two chosen individuals. Immediately after
the ancestor split there were two individuals of the same
type. Thus the s∗2 family consists of only one configura-
tion, a pair of identical individuals. From then onwards to
τ2, mutations can play a role. Hence, the probability that
the two individuals drawn have identical strategies when at
the s∗2 family level they have identical strategies, is given by
s
∗[2]
2 ,
s
∗[2]
2 (τ) = γ
2 +
2
n
γ(1− γ) + 1
n
(1− γ)2. (C3)
The index [2] in the superscript describes the composition
of the configuration. In this case denoting that both the
individuals are of the same strategy. The terms on the right
hand side from first to last can be described as follows. (i)
None of the trajectories mutate and hence the individuals
have identical strategies with probability 1. (ii) At least one
mutation occurs on one of the trajectories and the chance
that the new strategy is identical to the other is 1/n. As
there are two trajectories this can happen in two ways. (iii)
When both the trajectories mutate the first one gets some
strategy with probability 1 and the second also mutates to
the same strategy with probability, 1/n.
This has to be weighted by the probability that we begin
with two identical individuals at the s∗2 family level. As
this is the only possible configuration, the probability is 1.
Further we also need to integrate with the coalescent time
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density (Eq. (C1)) to finally get s2 as,
s2 = 1
∫ ∞
0
s
∗[2]
2 (τ)f2(τ)dτ
=
n+ µ
n(1 + µ)
. (C4)
This is a the case of a k-allele Moran model with replace-
ment [7].
2. Calculation of s3
Now we take a step further. What is the probability that
three randomly chosen individuals will have the same strat-
egy ? The distribution of coalescent times is given by the
density function for the coalescent event for three individu-
als which is given by f3(τ) = 3e
−3τ .
Similarly as above we first investigate the s∗3 family. At
time τ2 in the coalescent tree, one of the two individuals
splits. Thus in the s∗3 family, two individuals will always
have identical strategies. In all there can be only two con-
figurations, all three are identical or two have the same
strategy and the third differs.
We consider the two cases separately. If all three individ-
uals have the same strategy at the s∗3 family level, then the
probability that they have identical strategies after time τ
is,
s
∗[3]
3 (τ) = γ
3 +
3
n
γ2(1− γ) + 3
n2
γ(1− γ)2 + 1
n2
(1− γ)3.
(C5)
If two individuals have the same strategy and the third one
is different at the s∗3 family level, then the probability that
they have identical strategies after time τ is given by,
s
∗[2|1]
3 (τ) = 0 γ
3 +
1
n
γ2(1− γ) + 3
n2
γ(1− γ)2 + 1
n2
(1− γ)3
=
1
n
γ2(1− γ) + 3
n2
γ(1− γ)2 + 1
n2
(1− γ)3. (C6)
In the superscript the index [2|1] denotes that two indi-
viduals are of the same strategy and one is of a different
strategy. In this case we see that the first term for all three
trajectories not mutating vanishes. This is because when
we begin with the case when all the individuals do not have
identical strategies, they cannot be identical later in time if
no mutation occurs.
To get the full probability s3 we need to weight the above
two cases with the probabilities of their realizations. Three
individuals will be the same at the s∗3 family level if the two
individuals at τ2 are identical. This happens with probability
s2. The probability that they are not the same is thus 1−s2.
Putting in these weights and integrating over all possible
times, we get s3 as
s3 = s2
∫ ∞
0
s
∗[3]
3 (τ)f3(τ)dτ + (1− s2)
∫ ∞
0
s
∗[2|1]
3 (τ)f3(τ)dτ
=
(n+ µ)(2n+ µ)
n2(1 + µ)(2 + µ)
. (C7)
τ2
τ3
τ4
s2
s3
s4
s∗4
s∗3 family
family
familys∗2
FIG. 4. The coalescent as it evolves through time. The
probability that at time τi the i individuals have the same
strategy is given by si. Immediately after τi there are i + 1
individuals. The strategy configuration at that time point
depends if si was 1 or not. If not then exactly what was
the configuration? All these factors determine the possible
configuration of the immediate i + 1 individuals and these
different possibilities are grouped in the s∗i+1 family.
3. Calculation of s4
Here we calculate s4, i.e. the probability that four ran-
domly chosen individuals have the same strategy out of a
collection of n strategies.
We are interested in the probability that the four leaves of
the coalescent have the same strategy, cf. Fig. 4. At time
τ3, two of the four trajectories coalesce with rate 1. Hence
there is a coalescence at rate 6, and the density function
is given as, f4(τ4) = 6e
−6τ4 . Before the bifurcation occurs
at τ3 the three players can have the same strategy with
probability s3 or at least one is different with probability
1− s3.
If the three players have the same strategy then immedi-
ately after the coalescence there will be four players with the
same strategy. If the three players do not have the same
strategy then there are three different possible configura-
tions. This is the family of configurations we denote by s∗4.
Thus beginning with four individuals of different configura-
tions we are interested in the probability that after time τ
all four of them will have the same strategy.
The s∗4 family consists of four cases:
• Four identical individuals (Fig. 5 , s∗[4]4 ). In this
case they will be the same at time τ4 if none of them
mutate. If one of them mutates that can happen
with probability 4(γ)3(1 − γ) and they are the same
with probability 1/n. Similarly, we can write down
when two or three or all can mutate and we get the
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∗[4]
4
s
∗[3|1]
4
s
∗[2|2]
4
s
∗[2|1|1]
4
FIG. 5. The s∗4 family. All possible starting configurations
where there are 4 individuals. Two of them have the same
strategy. The figure shows all the possible combinations for
the remaining two individuals.
expression,
s
∗[4]
4 (τ) = γ
4 +
4
n
γ3(1− γ) + 6
n2
γ2(1− γ)2
+
4
n3
γ(1− γ)3 + 1
n3
(1− γ)4. (C8)
• Three of a kind (Fig. 5 , s∗[3|1]4 ). If only three are
the same then if no one mutates it is impossible for all
four to be the same at time τ4. Similarly we can argue
what happens if one, two, three or all four mutate and
we get the expression for s
∗[3|1]
4 :
s
∗[3|1]
4 (τ) =
1
n
γ3(1− γ) + 3
n2
γ2(1− γ)2
+
4
n3
γ(1− γ)3 + 1
n3
(1− γ)4. (C9)
• Two pairs (Fig. 5 , s∗[2|2]4 ). At least two need to
mutate such that we can end up with four identical
individuals. Additionally the two mutating must be-
long to the same pair. The last two terms are the
same as before:
s
∗[2|2]
4 (τ) =
2
n2
γ2(1− γ)2 + 4
n3
γ(1− γ)3 + 1
n3
(1− γ)4.
(C10)
• Single pair (Fig. 5 , s∗[2|1|1]4 ). At least two mutations
are necessary for all four individuals to have the same
strategy. The two mutations have to be on the tra-
jectory of the non-paired individuals. Again the last
two terms are the same as before:
s
∗[2|1|1]
4 (τ) =
1
n2
γ2(1− γ)2 + 4
n3
γ(1− γ)3 + 1
n3
(1− γ)4.
(C11)
To obtain the final probability s4 (all four individuals have
the same strategy), we combine all the above scenarios. But
we need to weight each of the scenarios with the probabil-
ity of the realization of the starting configuration. E.g. if
the system reaches the state of all individuals having the
same strategy from the second element of the s∗4 family, i.e.
s
∗[3|1]
4 , then we have to weight it by the probability of that
configuration, three of the same type and one different, Fig
5. This is possible if at τ3 we do not have all three of the
same type, but they must be of one of the the type 〈x1x2x2〉
or 〈x2x1x2〉 or 〈x2x2x1〉. Not only this, but the bifurcation
should occur at one of the two identical types (x2) and not
the different type (x1), the probability of which is
2
3 . Thus
we have to weight s
∗[3|1]
4 by
2
3 × (s2−s3)×3. We calculate
these weights for all the family members of s∗4 and thus get
an expression for s4 as,
s4 = s3
∫ ∞
0
s∗4(τ)f4(τ)dτ + 2(s2 − s3)
∫ ∞
0
s
∗[3|1]
4 (τ)f4(τ)dτ
+(s2 − s3)
∫ ∞
0
s
∗[2|2]
4 (τ)f4(τ)dτ
+(1− 3s2 + 2s3)
∫ ∞
0
s
∗[2|1|1]
4 (τ)f4(τ)dτ
=
(3n+ µ)(2n+ µ)(n+ µ)
n3(1 + µ)(2 + µ)(3 + µ)
. (C12)
4. Calculation of s¯4
Here we calculate the probability s¯4 of picking four indi-
viduals in the stationary state all having different strategies.
As before we can have four different starting configurations,
the same as shown in Figure 5.
Hence basically now we want to calculate the probability
that starting with each of the s∗4 family members what is
the probability of ending with all different individuals:
• Four identical individuals (Fig. 5 , s¯∗[4]4 ). We term
the probability to start with four identical strategy
individual to four different strategy individuals to be
s¯
∗[4]
4 . For four to be different at least three have to
mutate. It can be calculated as follows,
s¯
∗[4]
4 (τ) = 4γ(1− γ)3
(n− 1)(n− 2)(n− 3)
n3
+(1− γ)4 (n− 1)(n− 2)(n− 3)
n3
. (C13)
• Three of a kind (Fig. 5 , s¯∗[3|1]4 ). For all four individ-
uals to be different now we need at least two individ-
uals to mutate as we already have one individuals of
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a different type. Hence,
s¯
∗[3|1]
4 (τ) = 3γ
2(1− γ)2 (n− 2)(n− 3)
n2
+4γ(1− γ)3 (n− 1)(n− 2)(n− 3)
n3
+(1− γ)4 (n− 1)(n− 2)(n− 3)
n3
.
(C14)
• Two pairs (Fig. 5 , s¯∗[2|2]4 ). Here again we need at
least two individuals to mutate for all the individuals
to be different. Of the two individuals mutating each
should be of different types. Hence, in all there are 4
such combinations.
s¯
∗[2|2]
4 (τ) = 4γ
2(1− γ)2 (n− 2)(n− 3)
n2
+4γ(1− γ)3 (n− 1)(n− 2)(n− 3)
n3
+(1− γ)4 (n− 1)(n− 2)(n− 3)
n3
.
(C15)
• Single pair (Fig. 5 , s¯∗[2|1|1]4 ). For this starting con-
figuration a single mutation is enough to create all
different individuals provided it happens in one of the
paired individuals. If two individuals are to mutate,
then except for the two unpaired individuals together,
all other groupings of two can give four different in-
dividuals, hence in 5 different ways,
s¯
∗[2|1|1]
4 (τ) = 2γ
3(1− γ) (n− 3)
n
+ 5γ2(1− γ)2 (n− 2)(n− 3)
n2
+4γ(1− γ)3 (n− 1)(n− 2)(n− 3)
n3
+(1− γ)4 (n− 1)(n− 2)(n− 3)
n3
. (C16)
To get the final probability s¯4 we need to integrate all the
different starting configurations over the coalescent time
density and add them all together. Hence,
s¯4 = s3
∫ ∞
0
s¯∗4(τ)f4(τ)dτ + 2(s2 − s3)
∫ ∞
0
s¯
∗[3|1]
4 (τ)f4(τ)dτ
+(s2 − s3)
∫ ∞
0
s¯
∗[2|2]
4 (τ)f4(τ)dτ
+(1− 3s2 + 2s3)
∫ ∞
0
s¯
∗[2|1|1]
4 (τ)f4(τ)dτ
=
µ3(n− 1)(n− 2)(n− 3)
n3(1 + µ)(2 + µ)(3 + µ)
. (C17)
Due to the notational challenge, possible errors can arise
hence to check our results, we simulated a neutral Moran
process and computed the different averages, 〈x1x1x1x1〉,
〈x1x2x2x2〉, 〈x1x1x2x2〉, 〈x1x1x2x3〉 and 〈x1x2x3x4〉.
These quantities depend on all the probabilities calculated
in the Appendix namely s2, s3, s4 and s¯4. The results of
the simulation and analytical method are shown in Figure
6.
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FIG. 6. For a neutral Moran process with four strategies if we
pick four individuals from the stationary state then the prob-
ability that all of them have the same strategy is given by, s4,
Eq. (C12). For four strategies (n = 4), the probability that
all four have strategy 1 is s4/4 given by 〈x1x1x1x1〉. Similarly
the probabilities for 〈x1x2x2x2〉, 〈x1x1x2x2〉, 〈x1x1x2x3〉 and
〈x1x2x3x4〉 are plotted as a function of the mutation prob-
ability for a population size of N = 40. The symbols are
simulations while the lines are the analytical results.
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